Friday 2 September 2016

Flipkart's Fortunes

It has been widely reported that by 2020, India is expected to generate $100 billion online retail revenue out of which $35 billion will be through fashion e-commerce. Online apparel sales are set to grow four times in coming years. Key drivers in Indian e-commerce are:
  •   Large percentage of the country’s population subscribed to broadband Internet, burgeoning 3G internet users, and a recent introduction of 4G across the country.
  •   Rapid growth of smartphone users, soon to be world's second largest smartphone user base.
  •   Rising standards of living as result of fast decline in poverty rate.
  •   Availability of much wider product range on the online marketplaces compared to what is available at brick and mortar retailers.
  •   Competitive prices compared to brick and mortar retail driven by disintermediation and reduced inventory and real estate costs.
  •   Increased usage of online classified sites, with more consumer buying and selling second-hand goods
  •   Emergence of million-dollar startups like Flipkart, Snapdeal and others, and entry of multinational online marketplaces of the likes of Amazon.
Flipkart co-founders Binny Bansal (left) and Sachin Bansal

Growing Internet access, largely through smartphones, and the increasing emphasis on cashless transactions certainly make India a potentially lucrative market for e-commerce. The country’s sheer size and its population make it a potentially big market for e-commerce. Not surprisingly, Amazon, Flipkart[1] and Snapdeal[2] are battling it out for supremacy in this market, estimated to be worth $38 billion in 2016.

India should, sooner than later, is expected to allow foreign investment in supermarkets and also in e-commerce sites that are hybrid models allowing direct retail and serving as a marketplace Amazon follows this model in many countries, including the US.
The situation is further heightened by traditional brick and mortar retailers (both small and organised) who have taken both the legal and the lobbying route to prevent the march of the online marketplaces. While some of this opposition comes from small kirana stores, some definitely comes from Indian big retail that too would like some protection against the online marketplaces.

While this is the first of the challenge for the online marketplaces, the second is to build a brand and, through that, brand loyalty. Through 2014 and 2015, the marketplaces have been big advertisers on TV and in print, an evidence that the ability of the digital medium to build brands is still suspect. Despite that, none has managed to build brand loyalty. In part, the marketplaces themselves are to blame. They have used their capital, including venture capital, to fund discounts—to such an extent that many shoppers have been conditioned to expect significant discounts, sometimes in excess of 50%. To be sure, many have now gone slow on such sales, and will likely go slower, given the new government policy. The brand, and brand loyalty challenge remain. The third challenge is to get the supply chain and customer service right—certainly not an easy thing to do when millions of products are being sold to millions of customers across a few hundred cities and towns. Of the three marketplaces, only Amazon seems to have really focused on this, and the results are there for all to see.

Flipkart started off in September 2007 and has been the largest e-commerce firm in India since at least 2011, followed by Snapdeal. Until the June quarter of last year (2015), Amazon was a distant third.


Circa 2016

Flipkart reported gross sales of less than Rs.2,000 crore in July 2016, while Amazon’s gross sales crept up above Rs.2,000 crore.  Gross sales refer to the value of goods sold on a site, and not net revenue. Flipkart, Snapdeal and Amazon – all three are structured as online marketplaces in India because of regulations; their net revenue comprises the commissions they charge their third-party sellers on every transaction and fees for services. Flipkart seemed poised to lose its cherished status as India’s largest e-commerce firm to arch-rival and role model Amazon.com Inc.’s Indian unit after losing its lead in July 2016.

The American online retailer has remained intent solely on building popularity with customers through improving product selection, discounting, advertising and offering fast delivery. As of August 2016, Snapdeal offered more than 35 million products; Flipkart had more than 40 million products; while Amazon had more than 65 million. After learning from its mistakes in China, Amazon customized its offerings to suit the tastes and habits of Indian customers from the time of its launch. Amazon also found a way around the foreign direct investment (FDI) rules that ban online retail by setting up Cloudtail India Pvt. Ltd, its e-commerce retail joint venture with Infosys Ltd co-founder N.R. Narayana Murthy’s Catamaran Ventures. Cloudtail started operations in the middle of 2014 and soon became Amazon’s single-largest seller, contributing more than 40% of its business in some months. Amazon was able to control its customer experience via Cloudtail and its seller programmes such as Fulfilment by Amazon.


A Fashionable Acquisition

Fashion, which offers higher margins to online retailers compared with mobile phones and books, is expected to overtake consumer electronics as the largest category at 35% of total online spending by 2020. Online retail is expected to surge to $60 billion by then. For Flipkart, the acquisition of Jabong will extend its dominance in the fashion space and is seen as a move by the company to preserve its position as India’s No.1 e-commerce marketplace in the face of an onslaught by Amazon India. Flipkart, which also owns Myntra, the country’s largest specialty online fashion retailer, got a cut-price deal, paying just $70 million for Jabong, which was worth as much as $508 million in December 2013. Flipkart-Myntra is by far the largest online retailer of fashion in India, far ahead of Amazon India and Snapdeal. Myntra was acquired by Flipkart for $330 million in May 2014 in the biggest domestic consumer Internet deal at the time. The Jabong acquisition will widen that gap. Additionally, the acquisition of Jabong, which will be retained as a separate brand, will boost sales at Flipkart, which is struggling to revive sales growth and has been losing market share to Amazon.

Amazon India has been spending tens of millions of dollars on advertising and adding products in fashion. Snapdeal is seen to be the weakest of the lot in fashion and losing out on Jabong to Flipkart will come as a blow to the SoftBank and Alibaba-backed marketplace.
Both Flipkart and Snapdeal were aware that if Amazon India had a weakness, it was in the fashion segment. While Snapdeal (owned by Jasper Infotech Pvt. Ltd) was nervously weighing the consequences of acquiring Jabong with the company’s existing business structure, the regulatory issues and seeking answers to alleged corporate governance issues reported in the media, Flipkart took the deal as is.

Snapdeal’s legal team sent a long list of conditions; and were negotiating hard. They were worried about an investigation (into alleged irregularities at Jabong), if it happened post the acquisition. Snapdeal was also wavering between only the assets (just the technology and the brand name) of Jabong for cash or going ahead with a full share transaction. An asset purchase would have meant no liability on Snapdeal in case of a legal probe, if at all. These extensive negotiations were making Jabong’s investors nervous.
Flipkart, on the other hand, was swift. It was not afraid of buying Jabong’s shares for cash. The deal was actually put together in the last 48-72 hours. Flipkart was always interested in buying Jabong but the valuation that Jabong was seeking made it uncomfortable. The move to buy Jabong looks like a desperate attempt by Flipkart to maintain its market leadership position, albeit at a very attractive price of $70 million.

Global Fashion Group (GFG), Jabong’s holding company, had been looking for a buyer for Jabong for over a year. It had held discussions with several firms including Snapdeal, Future Group, Aditya Birla Group, Amazon and Flipkart. Jabong had started with an asking price of $1 billion in early 2015 when Amazon showed interest in its business. The deal fell through. By September 2015, the company was seeking a valuation of $500-$800 million and was talking to eBay, Paytm and a few others. Jabong, which matched larger rival Myntra in sales until early 2014, has ceded market share since then, as Myntra’s parent Flipkart has been spending hundreds of crores of rupees on advertisements and discounts to attract customers. Jabong’s value collapsed because of a combination of leadership issues, market share losses and a funding crunch.

“Jabong has built a strong brand that is synonymous with fashion, a loyal customer base and a unique selection with exclusive global brands. The acquisition of Jabong is a natural step in our journey to be India’s largest fashion platform. We see significant synergies between the two companies, especially on brand relationships and consumer experience,” said Ananth Narayanan, chief executive officer, Myntra (now part of Flipkart), who will now also run Jabong. “We will leverage each other’s capabilities and focus on healthy profitable growth,” said Narayanan. According to Narayanan, Jabong’s strength is in international brands and Myntra has strong private labels. “We can offer our private labels on Jabong,” he added. He also points at the target audience. While Jabong’s customer base is largely women, Myntra has a majority of male shoppers. “We want to together grow the market,” he added. Jabong offers more than 1,500 international high-street brands, sports labels, Indian ethnic and designer labels and over 150,000 styles from over a thousand sellers.


Reversal of Fortunes

Flipkart is in the middle of a storm of its own making: It is faced with a significant management churn at the top. For a company that pioneered e-commerce in the country, growth has virtually stalled since the middle of 2015, and the leadership team hasn’t been anle to figure out a way to kick-start sales. Its innovation engine isn’t firing. In e-commerce lingo, the gross sales  over a given period of time has not grown substantially. In the offline world, it is the equivalent of saying the sales or revenue numbers aren’t growing. And this, for the e-commerce pioneer that until now grew its gross sales by over 200% per annum for the past three years. Flipkart was the benchmark for a seamless buying experience until two years ago. Compared to Amazon, the search function is poor and the mobile site and app experiences are non-intuitive. The very culture that made Flipkart a runaway success in the first phase of its existence is now hindering its progress.

Sure, as things are, Flipkart is the market leader. But Amazon is sniping at its heels and Flipkart has no clue which way to go. No doubt, Flipkart is in the middle of a crisis of its own making, but it’s not too late to change its strategy. Millions of Indians are first-time buyers online. Flipkart needs to capture them earlier in their journey.


Innovation to boost sales?

India’s top e-commerce companies have introduced habit-changing offerings to customers in the past three months, but they are still struggling to find the products and services that will expand a nascent market that has worryingly declined since the start of the year.

Three months ago, Flipkart announced a “no-cost” equal monthly instalment (EMI) scheme, under which customers can buy higher-priced products such as premium smartphones, televisions, home appliances and other electronics via monthly instalments without paying interest. Flipkart also launched a Prime-like programme, Flipkart Assured, earlier this month.
In July 2016, online marketplace Amazon India  launched its well-known Prime membership programme in over 100 Indian cities, offering one-day and two-day delivery on lakhs of products for an initial fixed price of Rs.499. Subsequently, in an attempt to make product discovery easy for consumers, Amazon has now extended the Amazon’s Choice programme to India. Amazon Choice will recommend a specific product based on the needs of a shopper. This shall simplify product discovery for items on which buyers end up spending a lot of time researching. Snapdeal responded to its larger rivals Amazon and Flipkart that launched Amazon Prime[3] and Flipkart Assured[4] respectively as their premium services recently, by introducing its own loyalty service, Snapdeal Gold, towards the end of August 2016.

None of these services, however, addresses the core problem facing online retailers: the e-commerce market, in terms of the number of users, simply hasn’t grown so far this year. The last big innovations that expanded the market in a big way were the launches of high-quality, low-cost smartphones by Motorola and Xiaomi on Flipkart in 2014 and as well as its annual shopping event, Big Billion Day.


A long way to go? 

Back in 2007, when Flipkart was launched, e-commerce industry in India was taking its baby steps. Flipkart's founders Sachin Bansal and Binny Bansal, who were working for Amazon.com had an idea to start an e-commerce company in India. Both of them, who are alumni of IIT Delhi, left their jobs in Amazon to start their own business. In the first few years of its existence, Flipkart raised funds through venture capital funding. As the company grew in stature, more funding arrived. Flipkart repaid the investors’ faith with terrific performances year after year. In the financial year 2008-09, Flipkart had made sales to the tune of 40 million Indian rupees. This soon increased to 200 million Indian rupees the following year. The revenue figures of the online marketplaces should not be confused with the price of products sold (GMV[5] or gross sales); their revenues come from commissions these online marketplaces get from sellers or listing fees that they charge to list the products on their site. Their last round of fundraising had increased their value to $ 15 billion, however as of February 2016, their estimated value stood revised at $11 billion.

While in May 2015, the three leading e-commerce market places in India along with other smaller online e-commerce companies had clocked a combined GMV of $9 billion, that number had inched up to just about $10 billion at the end of May 2016, translating into an 11% annual growth. Flipkart has seen its GMV stall at about $4 billion for almost a year now, What's worth noting is that Flipkart had notched up a 400% growth the year before (FY 2015), when it's GMV zoomed from $1 billion to $4 billion, post which the numbers have remained flat.

Flipkart, to its credit, since its inception has grown rapidly in terms of gross merchandise value (GMV), but the company has been showing no signs of becoming profitable. As per data from the Registrar of Companies Flipkart did business of Rs.3,035.8 crore and reported a loss of Rs.719.5 crore for the year ended March 2014. In the previous fiscal FY13, the company had posted a revenue of Rs.1,195.9 crore and loss of Rs.344.6 crore; indicating the rise in its losses year on year. Interestingly, in an interview way back in July 2013 to Business Standard Flipkart’s promoters had said “Profitability is not a focus area. It’s a strategic decision. We can be profitable from today if we want. We can stop investing in one area and start making profits; it’s definitely possible. But we don’t want to remain as a small profitable company.”

The cash burn model of Flipkart has so far proved good to raise valuation in the impervious private equity markets but in public equity markets, the company will have to show real profits and give returns to investors to raise more funds. Companies who have given returns to investors in the equity markets had been built by the cash flows generated by the business and not by spending investor’s money.

Based on the numbers with the Registrar of Companies it is further understood that Flipkart earns around 10-12 % of the GMV as revenue. But it’s cost of handling these goods are around 15 %. The company will therefore need serious cost cutting just to turn profitable. However, since volumes are only ensured by huge discounts and high advertisement cost, cutting costs will not be easy.

As of now, Flipkart ships about eight million units a month. It has set itself an ambitious target:
  •          Ship one billion units a month by 2018
  •          Serve 100 million customers by 2018

Flipkart, it appears, clearly has a long way to go.


Disclaimer / Caveat: Whatever I have stated is publicly available information and does not represent the view of the firm I work for.

(This post is not copyrighted and may be reproduced freely with appropriate attribution of source)


[1] Flipkart is an e-commerce company founded in 2007 by Sachin Bansal and Binny Bansal. The company is registered in Singapore, but has its headquarters in Bangalore, Karnataka, India.
[2] Snapdeal is an online marketplace, based in New DelhiIndia. The company was started by Kunal Bahl, a Wharton graduate as part of the dual degree M&T Engineering and Business program at Penn, and Rohit Bansal, an alumnus of IIT Delhi in February 2010. 
[3] Amazon Prime is a paid service ($99 per year, plus a free 30-day trial or $10.99 per month) that gives Amazon shoppers a few distinct advantages. Members of Amazon Prime are eligible for free one- or two-day shipping on most items, among several other perks. It is a membership program that gives customers access to streaming video, music, e-books, free shipping and a variety of other Amazon-specific services and deals.
[4] Triggered by the launch of Amazon Prime in India, Flipkart has launched a revised version of its earlier loyalty program, by introducing Flipkart Assured. Under Flipkart Assured, customers get free delivery within 2-4 days on Flipkart Assured products above Rs 500. The products also go through stricter quality checks and a delivery assurance in any case of any mishaps or defects in the order.
[5] GMV is overall sales on an online marketplace, excluding discounts and returns which are an integral part of the e-commerce market.

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