It is just a Territorial Dispute…Really??
The traditional narrative
Kashmir, which has boundaries
with Tibet, China, Russia and Afghanistan, has been placed in a pronounced
strategic position. The Kashmir region has gone through a tumultuous history
through its existence as it has passed from ruler to ruler and empire to
empire.
The history of Kashmir is
entwined with the history of the broader Indian subcontinent and the adjoining
regions - comprising the areas of Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia. It
denotes a larger area that includes the Indian-administered state of Jammu and
Kashmir (which consists of Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh), the
Pakistan-administered territories of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit–Baltistan, and the
Chinese-administered regions of Aksai Chin and the Trans-Karakoram Tract.
Islamization in Kashmir took
place during 13th to 15th century and led to the eventual decline of the
Kashmir Shaivism in Kashmir. In 1339, Shah Mir became the first Islamic ruler
of Kashmir. For the next five centuries, Islamic rulers governed Kashmir,
including the Mughals, who ruled from 1586 until 1751, and the Afghan Durrani
Empire, which ruled Kashmir until 1819. In 1819, the Sikhs, under Ranjit Singh,
took over Kashmir. In 1846, after the Sikh defeat in the First Anglo-Sikh War,
and upon the purchase of the region from the British, the Raja of Jammu, Gulab
Singh, became the new ruler of Kashmir. The rule of his descendants, under the
protection of the British Crown, lasted until 1947, when the former princely
state became a disputed territory. Kashmir is now administered by three
countries: India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.
The Kashmiris are,
anthropologically, an Indo-Aryan Dardic ethnic group living in or originating
from the Kashmir Valley, located in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K). The bulk of Kashmiri people predominantly live in the Kashmir Valley
and also form a majority of the population in the Chenab region's Doda, Ramban
and Kishtwar districts. Smaller populations of Kashmiris also continue to live
in the remaining districts of the state of J&K.
Kashmiri (or Koshur) is spoken
primarily in the Kashmir Valley and Chenab regions of Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. As per the
2001 census of India there were over 5.5 million speakers of Kashmiri in India.Interestingly, people from the
Azad Kashmir (or Pakistan occupied Kashmir) are neither Kashmiris nor do they
speak the Kashmiri language. People from Azad Kashmir are typically related to
the people of northern Punjab in Pakistan, and they mostly speak Punjabi,
Pahari, Gujjari languages. There are very few Kashmiris (the Indo-Aryan Dardic
ethnic group who originally hail from the Kashmir Valley) in Azad Kashmir and
while they still speak Kashmiri but many of their younger generation have
adopted Pahari or Urdu and do not anymore speak Kashmiri. This essentially
means that there remains a linguistic divide between the present day
inhabitants of Pakistan-administered territories of Azad Kashmir and the
inhabitants of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
Islam is practically
the singular religion throughout the northern areas of the Indian-administered
state of J&K and Azad Kashmir on the Pakistani side of the 1972 Line of Control,
accounting for more than 99.5% of the population in every single district of
those two areas. On the Indian side of the LOC, Hinduism is the second most
numerous faith and accounts for a majority of the population in the three
southernmost districts of Jammu and in that region as a whole. Followers of the
Tibetan form of Buddhism are a definite majority in the large, but sparsely
populated district of Leh and in Zanskar tahsil in the southern part of Kargil
district. In the state of J&K as a whole, Islam is by far the leading faith
and accounted for close to 75% of the total population by 1981[1].
The overwhelming majority of
Kashmiris being Muslims, Islamic identity does plays a very important role in
the daily lives of the majority of the Kashmiri people. However, Kashmiris
across the religious divide have for centuries shared cordial and friendly
ties.
As on date, however, the prickly
issue remains the status of the Kashmir Valley, whose inhabitants are divided
between demanding independence or allegiance to Pakistan, with a proportion
opting to remain within India. The key issues that stems from the traditional
narrative on the Kashmir dispute include[2] –
- Demands of the Islamic majority of the inhabitants of the state of J&K living in the valley are not universally shared by the minorities living in different areas of the state.§ The Buddhist population of Ladakh has never supported the cause for either for Kashmir’s independence or accession to Pakistan, nor has the majority Hindu population of the Jammu region.
- To date, the Government of India has refused to reconsider the possibility of holding a plebiscite in J&K. Without, however, holding a plebiscite or referendum it is next to impossible to determine exactly what proportion of the people support which option.
The emerging narrative
The emerging narrative is that Kashmir
is definitely more than a territorial and nationality dispute. The disputes
emanates from the very fact that it is situated in the northern part of Indian sub-continent,
and has boundaries with China (Tibet), Russia and Afghanistan, and is thus placed
in a position of significant strategic importance. The Indian state of Jammu
and Kashmir (or J&K in short) is, geographically, a continuation of the
plains of West Pakistan into the mountains (western Himalayas).
A certain section of the
international community feels, and perhaps rightly so, that over period of many
years India and Pakistan have progressively arrived at a tacit agreement for
the settlement of ownership of territories and in all likelihood the ‘Line of
Control’ can be a step to it, and thus the dispute on Kashmir is no longer
about altering its boundaries. It is perhaps not too abstract to infer that the
military and civilian leadership of both countries recognize that the idea of
going to war on Kashmir is no longer realistic. Water (or the lack of it) has now
emerged as more central premise to the Kashmir issue between the two neighbours although
initially it was only a territorial issue, or at best an issue of nationality
for the original inhabitants of this strategic landmass in Asia.
J&K is emerged as a much
prized landmass for both India and Pakistan – essentially to ensure long term
sustainability of both nations by way of securing, controlling and harnessing precious
waters of this prized landmass.
Pakistan’s population has been growing
at an annual growth rate of 2.3 % as compared to India’s 1.3 %. Consequentially,
in the last five decades, Pakistan’s per capita water availability has dropped
from 5,600 to 1,038 cubic metres[3].
The figure is expected to further fall to 809 cubic metres by 2025, as
estimated by the Pakistan’s Water and Power Development Authority. The country
is fast moving from a water- scarce nation to a water-starved one. Its sole
dependence on the Indus — 70 % of the country’s inhabitants live in the Indus
basin — intensifies its critical water position.
Being an agricultural country, it’s
rivers – Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – are its
sources of life. These three rivers flow into Pakistan from the State of J&K.
Pakistan, readers may kindly note that, is a lower riparian country in the
Indus valley system.
According to a dominant school of
thought in Pakistan both Kashmir and the water flowing from Kashmir into
Pakistan are matters of life and death to Pakistan. The same school of thought
also perceives that without securing sovereignty for Kashmir Pakistan's
sovereignty and security will always be on threat.
What the Green Revolution gave
India and as well as Pakistan — an abundance to export water hungry crops — has
now become unfeasible. Even in the most arid areas, farmers have no alternative
but to irrigate their fields by flooding them. Few have adopted the much more
efficient drip irrigation system, which governments urgently need to subsidize.
Climate change too compounds the water problem. Experts say that climate change
could alter the timing and rate of snow melt, with an initial increase in
annual run-off, followed by a steep decrease as glaciers recede, severely impacting
river flows.
The Riparian Rights
Under riparian law, water is a
public good like the air, sunlight, or wildlife. It is not ‘owned’ by any
government, state or private individual but is rather included as part of the
land over which it falls from the sky or travels along the surface. ‘Riparian rights’
is a system for allocating water among those who possess land along its path. Under
the riparian principle, all landowners whose properties adjoin a body of water
have the right to make reasonable use of it as it flows through or over their
properties. If there is not enough water to satisfy all users, allotments are
generally fixed in proportion to frontage on the water source. These rights
cannot be sold or transferred other than with the adjoining land and only in
reasonable quantities associated with that land. The water cannot be
transferred out of the watershed without due consideration as to the rights of
the downstream riparian landowners.
The Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus Waters
Treaty (IWT, or Treaty), a water-distribution treaty between India and
Pakistan, mediated by the World Bank (then knows as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development), was signed in Karachi on September 19, 1960 by
then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President of Pakistan Ayub Khan.
While the World Bank is a signatory to the Treaty for certain specified
purposes, it is not a guarantor of the Treaty. The Treaty allows control over
the three ‘eastern’ rivers of the Indus river system— the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej
—to India and control the three ‘western’ rivers — the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab — to Pakistan. The treaty
stipulates that while water from the rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab will be
used exclusively by Pakistan, water from the rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej will
be used by India. The IWT also stipulates that either party (country) must
notify the other of plans to construct any engineering works which would affect
the other party and to provide data about such works.
While India cannot store any
water from these rivers or stop them from flowing to Pakistan, it can construct
hydroelectric power projects over these rivers, but has to allow a free flow of
water. India can however go in for ‘pondage’, i.e., water being held behind a
dam for a short time (as it flows into turbines to generate electricity) but
even this is limited. Pondage is very different from storing Indus water, say,
for major irrigation projects. Additionally, India must share designs of
projects for irrigation and hydro power generation, water flow data and a host
of other information with Pakistan.
The IWT, which is largely regarded
as one of the success stories of water diplomacy between two neighboring
nations, whose relations are often petulant, is essentially an arrangement to
implement a fair distribution of a critical natural resource – water – between
India and Pakistan. The Treaty also provides for mechanisms to resolve disputes
over water sharing.
The treaty was a result of
Pakistani apprehension that, since the source rivers of the Indus basin were in
India (in the state of J&K), India could therefore potentially create
droughts and famines in Pakistan, especially at times of war, by stopping or
diverting away water from downstream Indus and its sister rivers. The treaty, signed
more than five decades ago has remained in effect even during the wars between
India and Pakistan—in 1965, 1971 and 1999. However, the Pakistani State, in
spite of the Treaty being in place for over five decades now, has always
remained in perpetual apprehension of the possibility of India repealing the
Treaty, and the consequences of the same in Pakistani economy. That there is
solid ground for this apprehension emanates from the ever worsening water
crisis in Pakistani.
Pakistan’s Water Crisis
In a report published
in 2013, the Asian Development Bank had described Pakistan as one of the most ‘water-stressed
countries in the world, with a water availability of 1,000 cubic meters per
person per year, a fivefold drop since its independence in 1947, which is about
the same level as drought-stricken Ethiopia!
Total annual per capita actual
renewable water resources[4] in
Pakistan in 2014 had been estimated at 1,306 cubic meters. The graphic below illustrates the depletion in per capita renewable water resources in
Pakistan during 1962-2014[5].
A country with annual
water availability below 1,000 cubic metres per capita is designated as a
water-scarce country. Pakistan is expected to become water-scarce by 2035,
however based on current trends it is likely
that per capita water availability will decline to around 800 cubic
metres by 2025[6],
making Pakistan a water scarce country.
According to the Pakistan Council
of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR), the country has an estimated population
of 187 million with an annual growth rate of 1.57 %. By the year 2050, Pakistan’s
population is likely to double and become 63.7% urban. This will definitely put
tremendous pressure on water supply for households, industry and agriculture.
Pakistan has been facing a number of water related challenges. A few of these
challenges include:
- Water shortage
- Inadequate water harvesting and storage facilities (only 10% of the average annual flow)
- Reduction in storage capacities of the existing reservoirs due to sedimentation
- Low system efficiency
- Conventional methods of irrigation - unleveled basins, improper size of furrows
- Low land and water productivity
- Non-existent national water policy
- Water logging and salinity
- Unmanaged dry lands
- Lack of monitoring infrastructure for glaciers and trans-boundary inflows.
The aforementioned problems get compounded by the
apprehension of the Pakistani think tank that any action –intentional or
unintentional– on the part of the Indian authorities to control the water
supply of the Indus system can lead to famines and droughts in Pakistan.
Pakistan has also had limited success with harnessing its
water resources towards developing hydro power generation capacity in order to
meet its ever burgeoning energy demands. As on date Pakistan's energy
generating capacity is 24,830 MW; the country currently faces energy shortfalls
of over 4,500MW on a regular basis with routine power cuts of up to 5 hours per
day, which has shed an estimated 2–2.5% off its annual gross domestic product (GDP).
At the Crux of the Matter
At the root of the Kashmir crisis
lies the Indus river system. Pakistan, being largely an agrarian economy,
depends heavily on the Indus waters for agriculture, employment, and a
significant portion of its GDP. It is widely acknowledged that the Indus river
provides Pakistan with:
- 90% of its freshwater for agriculture
- 50% of the country's employment
- 25% of its GDP
It is no wonder therefore that the
inhabitants of Pakistan affectionately refer to the Indus[7] as
‘the water of life.’
Tumorous population growth in
both India and Pakistan has led to increased strain on the river for power
generation and drastic measures on the part of India to secure sufficient
hydropower to prevent sudden power outages. Pakistan for quite some time has
been accusing India of stealing water from ‘the water of life.’ Pakistan
alleges that India is ‘stealing’ its river waters, by violating the IWT.
Pakistan’s allegations, at the moment, centre on the Nimmo-Bazgo and Chutak
hydroelectric power projects over the Indus river in J&K. The allegation is
that by going ahead with these projects, India is trying to divert river waters
that rightly belong to Pakistan.
Many reports in recent times have
highlighted that India too is a water stressed country and its water disputes
(both intra and inter country) are bound to grow as Indian authorities strive
to manage water for India’s huge population. Renewable internal freshwater
resources in the country (in terms of cubic meters per capita) has come down
from 3,089 (in 1962) to 1,116 (in 2014)[8].
In comparison, the neighbouring nation of Myanmar has a per capita renewable
internal freshwater resources 18,770 cubic meters in 2014. Even Bhutan with per
capita renewable internal freshwater resources of 101,960 cubic meters lead the
south Asian nation in 2014.
The face-off between Punjab and
Haryana over sharing of Satluj-Yamuna water and as well between Tamil Nadu and
Karnataka over sharing of Cauvery water as the has put the spotlight on brewing
confrontations between states across India over access to water. Even the newly
formed state of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh too have locked horns over
numerous water projects. A recent study pegs that 80% of India’s 1.25 billion
population faces severe water scarcity for at least a month every year and 180
million Indians face severe water scarcity all year round. No, doubt India is
increasingly looking at harnessing hydropower to find sustainable answers to
its water and energy crisis.
What if the IWT were abrogated?
The Indus Water Treaty is one of
the best examples of cooperation between countries as the most logical response
to trans-boundary water management issues. India has not disturbed the flow of
water to Pakistan even during wars, acts of terrorism and other such conflicts
that have bedeviled relations between the two neighbours. The Treaty gives up
to 80 % of the water from six rivers — the Beas, Ravi, Sutlej, Indus, Chenab
and Jhelum — shared by the two countries to Pakistan, and has, therefore, been seen
in India as being ‘too soft’ on Pakistan.
Sadly, this treaty between India
and Pakistan, which has survived three wars and numerous lows in India-Pakistan
relations, stands seriously threatened today. The Indian Government,
understandably is under tremendous public pressure to take material actions
against Pakistan, to rein in terrorism stemming from the Pakistani soil against
India, as a repercussion to the gruesome killing of eighteen soldiers of the
Indian Army in the Uri terror attack on September 18, 2016 (in J&K).
Such negative sentiments stem
from such comments wherein the post owners (commentators) have not related
positively with the URI attacks i.e., they did not quite believe in the
authenticity of the attack, to that extent that many of them felt that the
attacks could have even been faked by the Indian State, in order to draw
attention of the international community to the Kashmir issue/Pakistan. However,
such sentiments cannot be seen as representative of the Indian population, as
the reach of English news channel is around 12 million as against the reach of
Hindi news channels which is about eight times that of the English news
channels.
An insightful
analysis (as illustrated in the figure underneath), undertaken by Data-Analyst
Adipta Datta (an alumnus of ICFAI Business School, Kolkata) based on the
comments made on social media pages (such as Facebook) of popular traditional
media such as NDTV, Firstpost and others immediately in the aftermath of the
URI incident and related to the incident, finds a significant percentage (63%) of
the commentators viewing the incident with skepticism, which Datta refers to as
negative sentiments associated with the incident.
In what was a much looked up to
high-level meeting chaired by the Indian Prime Minister with senior Government
officials on September 26, 2016 to review Indus Waters treaty, which had also
fueled speculations that the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government may
ultimately seek to alter or scrap the provisions of the 1960 pact with
Pakistan, it was decided that India will now expedite the construction of three
dams on River Chenab.
It is being widely perceived in
India that such a pressure tactic (of altering or scrapping the provisions of
the Treaty) is likely to compel Pakistan to crackdown on non-state and state
actors acting operating on its soil against India. This is not to say that
there are no pockets of cogent thought in India that question the astuteness
and practicality of this approach to confronting Pakistan. In this connection,
an editorial, published way back in 1998, in The Statesman, a venerable
English-language daily published in Kolkata is perhaps still relevant and is
worth quoting at some length:
“India, the bigger and arguably the more mature of the two (countries), must take the lead (in heading off an arms race). And no lead is better than a grand policy on Kashmir...India should respond to Pakistan’s tests and the possibility of escalating tensions by making a unilateral posture on Kashmir. It can announce that the government will exhume the nearly five decades old United Nations proposal to hold a referendum on the question of the valley’s (Jammu & Kashmir) territorial loyalty.This will seem preposterous to the BJP, indeed to many Indians. But an astute political party – BJP has shown it can be one – does not remain a prisoner of conventional wisdom. More, a referendum on and in Kashmir, internationally supervised, will again put India in a different league from one defined by sub-continental squabbles – a status the BJP thinks the country deserves. The ‘worst’ possibility is that Kashmir may not choose to remain with India. Is that too bad a prospect compared to the price India pays in blood, money, and a general marring of reputation when the troops ‘occasionally’ misbehave? A Kashmir referendum will also blunt global condemnation of the subcontinent as a mad hatter area full of nuke-wielding hot-heads. As well as forcing Pakistan to drop its belligerence, both verbal and clandestine. These are benefits that can be grabbed only by a government with vision and courage.”
Earlier on September 22 2016 India
signalled that it could
revisit the IWT on sharing of the waters of the river Indus, against the
background of Pakistani State ignoring Indian concerns over its continued
support to terrorism. However, a unilateral abrogation of the Indus Water
Treaty (IWT) on India’s part is likely to attract criticism from world powers. India
definitely runs the risk of alienating the World Bank if it abrogates the
treaty, especially the US, the UK, Canada, (then) West Germany, Australia and
New Zealand underwrote the facilitation of the treaty by contributing $1
billion (at 1959 rates) and virtually bribed Pakistan by giving it $315 million
to enter into negotiations with India. Besides, China will be under no
obligation to allow water from the Indus or Sutlej rivers to flow into India. Indus,
which is covered by the IWT, originates in China, the fountainhead of this
river basin lying in China.
China being not a party to the
Indus Water Treaty may decide to divert water from the Indus river in the
absence of any international treaty governing the management of this precious
resource, India will be deprived of 36 % of the river's entire flow. Countless
canals from which cities and towns draw water for daily use would dry up,
causing urban and semi-urban distress. If China also decides to shut off water
from Tibet that feeds the Sutlej river, huge swathes of northern India would be
plunged into darkness and deprived of power. Water from the Sutlej flows into
the Bhakra dam, the Karcham Wangtoo hydro-electric project and the Nathpa
Jhakri dam which together generate at least 3,600 megawatts of electricity that
lights up large parts of Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh,
Chandigarh and Delhi. Besides, stopping water supplies to Pakistan after any
abrogation of the 1960 Treaty is likely to flood extensive areas of Jammu and
Kashmir and Punjab.
There is also the possibility
that China could utilize the opportunity, in the event of IWT being abrogated
by the Indian Government, to divert water from the Brahmaputra river, which
forms the lifeline of India’s north eastern region.
Arguments & Counter Arguments
Arguments and counter
arguments, as well as allegations and counter allegations have led the two
countries nowhere, except that the such instances have only led to unnecessary
wars, and mistrust between two very culturally close set of populations. For
instance, while Pakistan’s allegation that Indian Government's plans to divert
the course of the Kishenganga river (a tributary of the Indus) to build a
330-megawatt hydroelectric power project will reduce the river’s flow by a
third in the winter. That would make it unfeasible for Pakistan to move ahead
with its own plans for a hydroelectric dam downstream.
Essentially, both India and
Pakistan were fighting over control of Kashmir since independence in 1947,
where several Indus tributaries begin, because control of Kashmir means gaining
the much needed control of the waters of the Indus system, until the IWT was
signed between the two countries in 1960. Yet Pakistan's rows with India have
intensified as its water situation has worsened over the years. On the
contrary, observers in India say Pakistan is simply looking for a scapegoat as
it struggles to manage its internal water politics – citing instances of the
especially arid Pakistani province of Sindh, blaming the prosperous upstream Pakistani
province of Punjab for consuming too much of Indus waters. But off-late even farmers
from the Punjab province have been complaining that agricultural yields and
incomes have dropped by a third in the past five years because of water
shortages. In the past, canals used to supply water for irrigation year-round.
They are now empty for about four months each year, forces farmers and villagers
to pump groundwater, which is fast turning brackish and causing diseases like
hepatitis.
Pakistan's rows with India have
intensified as its water situation has worsened over the years. In 2005
Pakistan had raised issues with the Baglihar dam, an Indian power project on
the Chenab river alleging that the dam
would store too much water upstream and reduce downstream flow to Pakistan. Subsequently
in 2007 the World Bank mediated by appointing an independent expert, who ruled
that India had to make minor modifications to the dam, such as lowering its height.
Pakistan now contends that the dam, which began operations in 2008, is reducing
the flow of the Chenab below levels stipulated in the treaty. India denies such
an allegation. The Indian projects that Pakistan believes are draining its
water resources are primarily on Indus tributaries in Kashmir.
B.G. Verghese, a veteran
journalist who has studied water issues closely and is a visiting professor at
the Center for Policy Research, a New Delhi based think tank, says,
"They're saying, 'We must liberate Kashmir to save our water.'"
Case
for an Alternate Dispute Resolution for Kashmir
It is quite understandable why the popular
Pakistani conscience revolves around Kashmir being the jugular vein of
Pakistan, because without Kashmir and its rivers, its dream of economic
independence is likely to remain utopian. This explains, why in spite of being supportive
of the Kashmiris ‘right of self-determination,’ Pakistan has never accepted the
third option as a possible outcome - a third option being Independent, and
allegiance to neither India nor Pakistan. The same logic is also perhaps true,
as to why India remains so steadfast on not conducting the much awaited
promised plebiscite.
The predominant reason why India and Pakistan have
been bickering over the control of Kashmir is because that is where several of
the Indus tributaries begin. Needless to say, that there is an immediate need
that, both India and Pakistan develop a transparent,
participatory, democratic, and rule-based management – with integrated regional
approach – of waters of the Indus system.
It needs to be appreciated by the
Indian think tank that success of the region (south Asia) is critical to
India's long term prosperity. Taking everybody along in the region, instead of
being the 'Big Brother' in the region, has to be Indian strategy for ensuring
nation’s long term sustainability.
It is the need of the hour that
both nations realize there are absolutely no brownie points to be acquired by
keeping control over a common natural resource – water of Indus system – which
is for public good for the riparian communities – upstream as well as
downstream. Any developmental activities being carried out on the upstream of a
river system, which has been conceived for good for the upstream communities and
without any regard to the downstream communities, is bound to impact
devastatingly the downstream communities. This in the long run will only create
animosity and mistrust between the communities; which will eventually lead to
nuclear polarization of the sub-continent – thereby putting lives of billions
of people in the region at stake.
Governments and States have no right to act so irresponsible.
It will therefore require policy
makers, researchers, advocacy groups, development professionals and civil society
groups from both nations to come together on one platform and build mutual
awareness and understanding of the common water resource challenges and put
pressure on their respective Governments to works towards achieving sustainable
development in all its three dimensions – social uplift, economic development
and environmental conservation.
Beyond Kashmir
India, owing to its demographic
size and nuclear arsenal, sees its role as a potential counterweight to China
on the global platform, and expects that this would translate into economic
importance and the much coveted seat on the United Nations Security Council.
However, by and large, global strategic currents still continue to bypass
India.
India, perhaps instead of looking
at China as a potential aggressor, needed to have attempted at understanding
China’s global trade and business aspirations and interests, and in the process
could have seen itself as a major ally.
The Indian policy makers need to understand that the principal measure
of power in the 21st century is connectivity, specifically to global
infrastructure networks, trade flows, capital markets and the digital economy; and
by that measure China is already a dominant global power. China, as of today,
ranks as the top trade partner of more than 120 countries in the world, which
is double the number for the US (56), and far higher than for India (just one).
Many decades back, when the United States was by far the dominant economic
super power, India was far from anything that could have been remotely termed
as ‘being on friendly terms’ with the United States. Even now, India views
China with great mistrust. In fact, India not mistrusts China but is also
equally sceptic about having a trustworthy relationship with its major
neighbours – Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. It is sad, all these
nations have had a shared past for millennia of growth, prosperity, trade and
culture, and even very recent shared experiences of colonial hardships. People
to people connect, owing to shared culture across Indian subcontinent still
remains strong, and yet, India has miserably failed to convert such powerful
connects into formal avenues for economic growth and prosperity.
It needs to be understood with
immediate effect, where India has been failing, w.r.t cultivating a mutually
beneficial relationship with neighbors, China is having great success at that –
creating and forging alliances (especially in the Indian ocean rim) for the
future.
The China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor often referred to by the acronym CPEC is one such example.
The CPEC, is a collection of projects currently under construction at a cost of
$46 billion[9],
intended at rapidly expanding and upgrading Pakistani infrastructure as well as
deepen and broaden economic ties between Pakistan and China. Infrastructure
projects under the tutelage of CPEC is expected to span the length and breadth
of Pakistan, and will eventually link the city of Gwadar in southwestern
Pakistan to China's northwestern autonomous region of Xinjiang via a vast
network of highways and railways. Over $33 billion worth of energy
infrastructure are to be constructed by private consortia to help alleviate
Pakistan's chronic energy shortages, which regularly amount to over 4,500MW.
Over 10,400MW of energy generating capacity is to be developed between 2018 and
2020 as part of the corridor. CPEC will be a strategic game changer in for
Pakistan’s economy and also in the south-Asian region. The Government of India
instead of seeking benefits from this regards portions of the CPEC project
negatively as these pass through the Pakistani-administered side of Kashmir, a
territory that India disputes.
In response to India’s objection
to the corridor, the Chinese Government has stated that the CPEC which passes through
Pakistan occupied Kashmir, is not designed to target India or take Pakistan’s
side on the Kashmir dispute; instead is certainly a platform to further
strengthen China-Pak cooperation. The Chinese position on the CPEC is that the
corridor also benefits the region and is likely to positively contribute to the
peaceful and steady development of the south Asian region and that many
countries have already expressed their willingness to be a part of the project.
It remains open to speculation
whether India will choose to oppose the CPEC or seek an active role for itself
in the integrated regional development, that the CPEC is expected to
facilitate. Even as India seeks to improve trade relations with countries along
the Indian Ocean periphery, it must focus on improving its trade balance with
China through higher value-added exports, and at the same time also on attracting
more and more foreign direct investment from China into power, transportation
and other key sectors – sectors that will lead to – social uplift and economic
development in India.
To not connect to India’s
neighbors – China, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and beyond is to
further cede strategic ground along the 21st century’s new trade routes.
Disclaimer / Caveat: The article reflects the views of the writer alone and does not seek to offend any community within or outside India. Its purpose is to purely encourage discussion.
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[1] JAMMU
AND KASHMIR: DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIONS,
http://www.kashmirstudygroup.com/awayforward/mapsexplan/religions.html
[2]
Victoria Schofield, "Kashmir's forgotten plebiscite", BBC News World
Edition (17 January, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1766582.stm
[3] Manipadma
Jena, "NOT A SINGLE DROP TO DRINK", The Telegraph (May 6, 2010), http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100506/jsp/opinion/story_12381918.jsp
[4] As
per the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations renewable
water resources are computed on the basis of the water cycle. They represent
the long-term average annual flow of rivers (surface water) and groundwater.
Natural renewable water resources are the total amount of a country’s water resources,
both surface water and groundwater, which is generated through the hydrological
cycle. The amount is computed on a yearly basis. Not all natural freshwater,
surface water or groundwater, is accessible for use. Exploitable water
resources (manageable water resources or water development potential) considers
factors such as: the economic and environmental feasibility of storing
floodwater behind dams or extracting groundwater; the physical possibility of
catching water which naturally flows out to the sea; and the minimum flow
requirements for navigation, environmental services, aquatic life, and others.
[5] Food
and Agriculture Organization, AQUASTAT data,
https://knoema.com/atlas/Pakistan/Total-renewable-water-resources-per-capita
[6] http://www.gwp.org/Global/GWP-SAs_Files/CWP%20reports/World-Water-Day-Events-report-2015-Pakistan.pdf
[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2cUJ8IeNXd0
[8]
Food and Agriculture Organization, AQUASTAT data,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.PC?year_high_desc=true
[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93Pakistan_Economic_Corridor
